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1. THE ADA AND ITS COMPARABLE LINES OF SIGHT REQUIREMENT
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (AA) states
that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation."2 After enacting the ADA, Congress
charged the Attorney General with promulgating more specific
regulations to clarify how public accommodations may meet the
standard imposed by this general rule. 3 In.doing so, Congress re-
quired these regulations "to be consistent with the minimuni
guidelines issued by the" Architectural and Transportation Bar-
riers Board, also known as the Access Board.4 The Access Board
issued its ADA Accessibility Guidelines in 1991,5 and the Attorney
General subsequently adopted them as the "Standards for Access-
ible Design."6 Section 4.33.3 of the Standards for Accessible De-
sign deals with wheelchair seating in public assembly areas and
reads as follows:
Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seat-
ing plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with
physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (2006).
2. Id. § 12182(a).
3. U.S. v. AMC Entm't., Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 763 (9th dir. 2008) (citing 42 § U.S.C.
12186(b)).
4. AMC, 549 F.3d at 763 (citing 48 U.S.C.A. § 12186(c)).
5. Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and
Facilities, 56 Fed.Reg. 35,408 (July 26, 1991).
6. 28 C.F.R. § 36, appendix A (2009).
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sight comparable to those for members of the general public.
They shall adjoin an accessible route that also serves as a
means of egress in case of emergency. At least one companion
fixed seat shall be provided next to each wheelchair seating
area. When the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair
spaces shall be provided in more than one location. Readily
removable seats may be installed in wheelchair spaces when
the spaces are not required to accommodate wheelchair users.
EXCEPTION: Accessible viewing positions may be clustered
for bleachers, balconies, and other areas having sight lines
that require slopes of greater than 5 percent. Equivalent ac-
cessible viewing positions may be located on levels having ac-
cessible egress.7
Shortly afterward, in the early half of the 1990s, movie theatres
introduced and implemented stadium-style seating.8 The earliest
form of these stadium-style theatres were a hybrid of traditional
sloped floor seating near the front of the room and stadium seat-
ing, accessible by stairs, near the back.9 Moviegoers had the
choice of either sitting in the front few rows of traditional seating
or sitting in the new, preferable stadium-style seats.10 While most
people avoided the traditional seating, the fact that these new
stadium-style seats were accessible only by stairs prevented dis-
abled moviegoers from utilizing them altogether."1 Instead, they
were relegated to "the least desirable seats in the rows closest to
the screen," which made viewing the movie both difficult and un-
comfortable.'12
The 1991 Standards for Accessible Design preceded the intro-
duction of stadium-style seating by several years.13 As a result,
they did not adequately address the issue of whether the phrase
"lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general pub-
lic" meant that wheelchair seating for disabled moviegoers must
provide viewing angles that are at least equivalent to those avail-
7. AMC, 549 F.3d at 763-64 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36, appendix A § 4.33.3 (some em-
phasis removed)).
8. Id. at 762.
9. Id. at 762.
10. Id. at 762-63.
11. Id.
12. AMC, 549 F.3d at 763.
13. Id. at 764.
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able to other, non-disabled patrons.' 4  However, in 1999, the
Access Board noted that the Department of Justice had inter-
preted the provision as mandating that wheelchair seating areas
"provide viewing angles that are equivalent to or better than the
viewing angles. ... provided by 50 percent of the seats in the audi-
torium."15 Accordingly, the Access Board noted that it would con-
sider whether or not it would include in its rules specific require-
ments consistent with the Department of Justice's interpretation
of section 4.33.3, and whether it would provide guidance on de-
termining whether sight lines are "comparable" in public assembly
areas.' 6 However, over ten years later, the Access Board has
failed to follow through with this commitment. 17 This failure has
led to a barrage of litigation and a split among several federal cir-
cuits. The circuit split exists over the question of whether section
4.33.3 requires that disabled patrons be provided with similar
"6viewing angles." This Comment will explore the circuit split and
advocate for an affirmative answer to the question.
11. LEGAL LANDSCAPE SURROUNDING SECTION 4.33.3
The first case involving section 4.33.3, Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,' 8 involved the MCI Center, an arena
which was then under construction in downtown Washington,
D.C.'9 The arena was intended to house NBA games, NHL games,
concerts, and other special events. 20 Wheelchair users, under-
standing that the excitement elicited in these types of events often
results in people standing to cheer on their favorite teams and
performers, became concerned that the designated wheelchair
seats may not allow them to see the most dramatic moments of
games and other events.2' The central issue in the case, then, be-
came whether or not the "lines of sight" language in section 4.33.3
required that wheelchair seating allow its occupants to have
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting 64 Fed.Reg. 62,248, 62,278 (Nov. 16, 1999)).
16. Id.
17. AMC, 549 F.3d at 764.
18. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
19. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 580.
20. Id. The arena, now known as the Verizon Center, plays host to the NBA's Wash-
ington Wizards, the WNBA's Washington Mystics, the NHL's Washington Capitals, the
Georgetown University men's basketball team, concerts, and numerous other events. Veri-
zon Center Facts, http://www.verizoncenter.com/about (last visited June 11, 2010).
21. Id.
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sightlines over the heads of standing spectators.22 Paralyzed Vet-
erans of America ("the Veterans") argued that it did, while D.C.
Arena L.P. ("the Arena"), argued that it did not.23 The district
judge agreed generally with the Veterans, but found that section
4.33.3 did not require that every wheelchair seat have a line of
sight over standing spectators.24 Instead, the judge found that
"substantial compliance" with section 4.33.3 was sufficient to
avoid liability.25 Both sides challenged the ruling.26 The Arena
claimed that the court erred in reading section 4.33.3 to require
any sightlines over standing spectators, while the Veterans ar-
gued that the judge erred in not requiring that all wheelchair
seats have such sightlines.27
The Arena began by arguing that "lines of sight comparable to
those for members of the general public" means only that wheel-
chair seating must be dispersed throughout the entirety of the
arena, rather than concentrated in a particular section or area of
the facility.28 The Veterans, joined by the government, responded
by pointing out that the regulation, by requiring facilities with
over 300 seats to provide wheelchair seating in more than one lo-
cation and requiring that wheelchair users have a choice of admis-
sion prices, already provides for a dispersal of wheelchair seating
throughout the facility.29 Therefore, the Veterans argued, the
"lines of sight" language must have another meaning in order to
avoid redundancy.30
The Arena also argued that "lines of sight comparable" had tak-
en on a specific meaning, which did not involve temporary ob-
structions like those caused by standing spectators, by the time it
was used in the regulation. 31 While the court did not elaborate on
what this specific meaning was alleged to be, it dismissed the
Arena's notion that the language had developed any type of "un-
22. Id. at 581.
23. Id. at 582.
24. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 582.
25. Id. The district judge found the appellant's original plan insufficient to meet the
standard of "substantial compliance," but approved a subsequent plan which would provide
lines of sight over standing spectators in 78-88% of the wheelchair seating areas, depending




28. Id. at 583.
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iversally accepted linguistic meaning," let alone one contrary to
that asserted by the Veterans.32
The court went on to state that although the phrase "is easily
read as [requiring] a view no more obstructed than would be
available to non-wheelchair users," whether it refers only to per-
manent obstructions rather than the temporary obstructions
caused by standing spectators, is ambiguous. 33 As a result of this
ambiguity, the court was faced with the issue of whether the in-
terpretation found in the Department of Justice's Americans with
Disabilities Act Title III Technical Assistance Manual, which re-
quires lines of sight over standing spectators, was entitled to any
deference. 34 Given that Congress charged the Department of Jus-
tice was charged with promulgating the regulations, the court de-
termined that the Department's interpretation of those regula-
tions was entitled to deference. 35
On the other hand, the court disagreed with the Veterans re-
garding the required degree of compliance with section 4.33.3.
The court determined that the district judge "was more than justi-
fied in concluding there was a good deal of wiggle room in the de-
gree of compliance contemplated by the regulation and manual,
and that he, as a judge sitting in equity, had ample discretion to
fashion the remedial order that he did."3 6 As a result, the lower
court ruling was affirmed.37
Two years later, in Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Enter-
tainment Centre at the Waterfront,38 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit was called upon to examine the
32. Id. The court explained:
The [lines of sight] language had its genesis apparently in guidance issued by the
American National Standards Institute, a private body, in 1980. Appellants contend
that there is no contemporary manifestation-not even a hint-that the Institute
meant the phrase to reach the standing spectator problem. That may be so. Still, as
appellees and the government correctly insist, there was no uniformly understood
construction of the language prior to the time it was picked up by the Board and the
Department. Although there is no indication that the words were intended to ad-
dress sightlines over standing spectators, neither is there any evidence to the con-
trary. The words simply had not taken on a well-understood meaning.
Id.
33. Id.
34. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 584. The Department of Justice first published the Manual
in 1994. Id. at 582-83. Although it initially said nothing about sight lines over standing
spectators, a later supplement explicitly stated that "lines of sight comparable" required
lines of sight over standing spectators. Id.
35. Id. at 585-87.
36. Id. at 589.
37. Id.
38. 193 F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1999).
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"lines of sight" language. Like D.C. Arena, however, Caruso dealt
only with determining whether section 4.33.3 simply required a
"dispersal" of wheelchair seating areas that would allow wheel-
chair-bound patrons a choice of a variety of viewpoints, or if it re-
quired lines of sight that would be unobstructed when other pa-
trons stood.39 While the court held that section 4.33.3 required
nothing more than a "dispersal,"40 the court did not address, nor
did it need to address, the "viewing angles" question.
In Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc.,41 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was faced with a section 4.33.3 suit,
this time involving a newly-built movie theatre. The movie thea-
tre in question was a "Tinseltown" complex in El Paso, Texas,
which had incorporated the then-new "stadium style" seating into
its design. 42 Tinseltown had designated wheelchair areas; howev-
er, they were not located in the stadium-style portion of the thea-
tre. 43 Instead, they were designated in a flat portion of the thea-
tre, near the front of the seating area, and surrounded by tradi-
tional, non- stadium- style public seating.44 City and state inspec-
tors had reviewed and approved the Tinseltown plans prior to con-
struction and, after it was built, again approved the seating confi-
gurations.45
The plaintiffs in the case, a group of disabled individuals and
advocacy groups, brought suit shortly after the theatre opened,
claiming that, in a number of the theatres in the Tinseltown com-
plex, the wheelchair areas were too close to the screen and too far
below it to provide wheelchair-bound moviegoers with a comforta-
ble viewing experience. 46 They alleged that, while the theatre
gave non-disabled moviegoers improved sight lines, it forced its
39. Caruso, 193 F.3d at 732-37.
40. Id. at 736-37.
41. 207 F.3d 783 (5th cir. 2000).
42. Lara, 207 F.3d at 785. As the court explained: "Stadium-style theaters roughly
emulate the seating configuration of a typical sports stadium, providing stepped-seating
that rises at a slope of well over five percent. This elevated seating configuration elimi-
nates the line-of-sight problems that typically occur, for example, when a tall individual
sits in front of a shorter individual." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. More specifically, during construction, cine mark submitted the Tinseltown
architectural plans to the Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation (TDLR) and to
the City of El Paso. Id. After reviewing the plans, the city inspectors granted conditional
approval to move forward with construction. Id. Once the construction was completed in
1997, the city and state inspected the facilities. Id. Inspectors from both entities approved
the seating configurations, including the wheelchair placements. Id.
46. Id.
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wheelchair-bound patrons to sit in inferior viewing areas where
they had to crane their necks in order to see the screen.47
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, finding that, since wheelchair-bound moviegoers would
have to uncomfortably crane their necks to see the screen, they
were denied "the full and equal enjoyment of the movie going ex-
perience in these [sic] theatres. 48 Accordingly, the court ordered
damages and injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring
modification of the theatre's seating and screen layout.49 Cine-
mark appealed, arguing that the district court had improperly in-
terpreted and applied the ADA and its guidelines.50
Cinemark argued that it had not violated section 4.33.3 because
the lines of sight it offered its wheelchair-bound patrons were
comparable to those available to members of the general public.51
The wheelchair areas were comparable, Cinemark explained, "be-
cause they are located in the midst of general seating and do not
suffer from any obstructions." 52
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by explaining that, while
existing case law in other circuits had previously addressed the
issue of viewer obstruction, it had not yet considered the related
issue of "whether theaters are required to provide wheelchair seat-
ing areas with 'viewing angles' that are as comfortable as those
enjoyed by the general public."53 It further noted that, neither the
Manual nor the Access Board addressed the viewing angles is-
sue.54 The court pointed out that, while the Access Board was, at
that time, proposing modifications to section 4.33.3, those pro-
posed changes "define[d] 'line of sight' problems only in the context
of obstructed views."5 5 The court explained additionally that al-
though "lines of sight" lacked a clear meaning at the time section
47. Lara, 207 F.3d at 785.
48. Id. (quoting Lara v. Cinemark USA, No. EP-97-CA 502 H, 1998 WL 1048497, at *2
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 1998)).
49. Id. at 785-86.
50. Id. at 786.
51. Id. at 788.
52. Lara, 207 F.3d at 788.
53. Id. (citing D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 583-4 (holding that section 4.33.3 does require
auditorium -owners to provide wheelchair areas with lines of sight unobstructed by stand-
ing spectators); Caruso, 193 F.3d at 736 (holding that section 4.33.3 does not reach issue of
sightlines over standing spectators); Indep. Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982
F.Supp. 698, 743 (D.Or.1997) (holding that section 4.33.3 "does not purport to decide
whether lines of sight over standing spectators are-or are not-necessary in order to
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4.33.3 was adopted, the phrase meant "unobstructed view" in a
number of other contexts, including FCC regulations regarding
antennae, 56 the meaning of "direct supervision," 5 7 and snowmobile
driving regulations.58
The court therefore concluded that the phrase "lines of sight
comparable" did not require that a theatre provide its wheelchair-
bound patrons with anything more than unobstructed views of the
screen, regardless of any discomfort that may result.59 As the
court pointed out, "To impose a viewing angle requirement at this
juncture would require district courts to interpret the ADA based
upon the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of dis-
abled moviegoers." 60 This would be in clear conflict with Con-
gress's intent, in granting the Department of Justice and the
Access Board the authority to promulgate regulations under the
ADA, to provide clear disability -related guidelines to those operat-
ing theatres and other places of public accommodation. 6 1 As a re-
sult, the court held that section 4.33.3 did not require theatres to
provide the same viewing angles available to the general public
and reversed the district court's judgment.62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, when
faced with a similar set of facts in Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.,63 provided a different result. In
that case, the defendants owned and operated six movie theatres
that had stadium-style seating. 64 As in Lara, the stadium-style
seats were inaccessible to wheelchair-bound moviegoers, who were
instead relegated to seats in the first few rows of the theatre, close
to the screen.65 Viewing movies from the resulting angle created
discomfort for those patrons.66
56. Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.685 (2000) (requiring that antennae have unobstructed
lines of sight of the communities which they serve)).
57. Lara, 207 F.3d at 789 (citing 46 c.F.R. § 13.103 (2000) (defining "direct supervision"
as supervision allowing a line of sight of the individual being supervised)).
58. Id. (citing 36 c.F.R. § 2.18 (2000) (forbidding children under age 16 from operating




62. Lara, 207 F.3d at 789.
63. 339 F.3d 1126 (9th cir. 2003).
64. Regal, 339 F.3d at 1127.
65. Id. at 1127-28. In all six of the theatres, seating for disabled customers was only
available in the first five rows. Id. at 1127. In five of those theatres, wheelchair -accessible
seating was only available only in the sloped section of the theatre floor, and not in the area
of the theatre which housed stadium-style seating. Id. at 1 127-28. In those five theatres,
over half of the wheelchair-accessible seating was in the very first row. Id. at 1128. There-
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The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding
that the lines of sight" language did not require that wheelchair-
accessible seating provide its occupants with viewing angles com-
parable to those in the general seating areas. 6 7 The district court
relied heavily on Lara, which was, at that time, the only federal
appeals court decision that directly addressed the viewing angle
question. 68
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by determining that the
central question of the case was "whether it is unreasonable for
[the Department of Justice] to interpret 'comparable line of sight'
to encompass factors in addition to physical obstructions, such as
viewing angle." 69 Based on the plain meaning of the language of
section 4.33.3, both generally and in the theatre industry, the
court determined that the answer to that question was "no."70 The
court admitted that, since stadium-style seating had not yet come
into use when section 4.33.3 was promulgated, the Department of
Justice likely did not have it in mind at that time.71 However, the
court held that this fact alone was not dispositive since "a broadly-
drafted regulation-with a broad purpose-may be applied to a
particular factual scenario not expressly anticipated at the time
fore, wheelchair-bound patrons had "no choice but to sit in the first few rows" of these thea-
tres, and deal with the resulting discomfort. Id.
66. Id. at 1128. The court elaborated on the nature of this discomfort, explaining:
Plaintiffs' experts, who visited the theaters and conducted research there, found that
the vertical lines of sight for the wheelchair seating locations ranged from 24 to 60
degrees, with an average of approximately 42 degrees, as compared with the average
median line of sight of 20 degrees in the non-wheelchair seating-a difference the ex-
perts termed a "tremendous disparity." In reality, however, the disparity is even
greater, because wheelchair-bound patrons cannot slump in their seats and recline
their bodies in order to adjust for the unfavorable viewing angle, as can able-bodied
patrons sitting in the same part of the theater.
In its engineering guideline for movie theaters, the Society of Motion Picture and
Television Engineers ("SMPTE") concluded that, for most viewers, physical discom-
fort occurs when the vertical viewing angle to the top of the screen exceeds 35 de-
grees, and when the horizontal line of sight measured between a perpendicular to the
viewer's seat and the centerline of the screen exceeds 15 degrees. Thus, not only do
the wheelchair seats themselves have, on average, highly unfavorable viewing angles
relative to the rest of the theater, but the patrons sitting in them will be less able
than other patrons to adjust for those angles by shifting position in their seats.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 1129 (citing Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 142 F.
Supp.2d 1293, 1297-98 (D. Or. 200 1)).
68. Id. (citing Regal, 142 F. Supp. at 1297).
69. Regal, 339 F.3d at 1132.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1132-33.
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the regulation was promulgated."72 One of the main goals of the
ADA, as the court pointed out, is to ensure that individuals with
disabilities can access "the full and equal enjoyment" of all aspects
of any place of public accommodation. 7 3 However, requiring dis-
abled moviegoers to have to crane their necks and sit in uncom-
fortable seats hardly constitutes such "full and equal enjoyment."74
As a result, the court found that section 4.33.3 requires viewing
angles within the range of angles available to the general public. 75
Later that same year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit also examined the stadium-style seating ques-
tion in United States v. Cine mark USA, InC.76 The Sixth Circuit
rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Lara and instead held
that the plain meaning of "lines of sight comparable to those for
members of the general public" found in section 4.33.3 required
more than just an unobstructed view.77 The court noted that the
word "comparable" was obviously intended to mean "similar," and
that similarity would undoubtedly include similarities in viewing
angles.7 8 Additionally, the court held that deference should gen-
erally be given to an agency's interpretation of its own regula-
tion.79 Therefore, the court remanded the case and charged the
district court with determining the extent to which lines of sight
must be similar for disabled moviegoers beyond just an unob-
structed view.80
The next appellate decision regarding section 4.33.3 and sta-
dium-style seating was United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp.,81
which was heard by the First Circuit the following year. As in
Cinemark, the court began by looking at the language of the regu-
lation itself.8 2 While the court admitted that the phrase "lines of
sight" was general enough to be interpreted with equal support
either way, it found that the underlying policy of the statute
tipped the scales in favor of an interpretation which would include
similar viewing angles. 83 The court noted that the ADA "places
72. Id. at 1133 (citing Pa. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)).
73. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
74. Regal, 339 F.3d at 1133.
75. Id.
76. 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003).
77. Cinemark, 348 F.3d at 576-78.
78. Id. at 576.
79. Id. at 578.
80. Id. at 579.
81. 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004).
82. Hoyts, 380 F.3d at 566.
83. Id. at 566-67.
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substantial emphasis on equality of access" and, while absolute
equality between disabled and non-disabled viewing experiences
could never truly be achieved, such a goal should be pursued to
the greatest extent possible.84
111. "VIEWING ANGLES": THE ONLY PROPER INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 4.33.3
The conversion to stadium-style seating in movie theatres
across the country, its subsequent failure to properly modify the
regulatory language in order to more clearly accommodate the
"9viewing angles" interpretation, particularly in light of the litiga-
tion explored above, is deserving of less sympathy. However, even
in spite of this failure, it remains the case that the "viewing an-
gles" interpretation of section 4.33.3 is the only proper interpreta-
tion for a number of reasons.
First, as the Sixth Circuit stated in Cinemark, the phrase "com-
parable lines of sight" obviously means "similar" lines of sight.85
The word "comparable," in general parlance, is a near synonym of
"similar,"86 and the Access Board undoubtedly had this common
sense meaning in mind when it drafted section 4.33.3. While the
regulation does not explicitly list the criteria for establishing simi-
larity between lines of sight, 87 it is unreasonable to assume that
the list of criteria would only include unobstructed views. In fact,
if all the Access Board was concerned about were unobstructed
views, it would have said so in a more direct and explicit manner.
By using the term "comparable," without providing any specific
criteria for judging similarity, the Access Board was likely ac-
knowledging the difficulty inherent in developing any such list of
criteria and providing inspectors, agencies, and courts with the
flexibility necessary to apply the regulation to the wide range of
public accommodation facilities across the country. Judging simi-
larity or comparability in such a broad context is, by its nature, a
fact-intensive exercise which involves weighing a number of fac-
tors in a somewhat subjective analysis. What points of similarity
are most important in each specific situation likely vary by venue,
and any attempt to capture all the relevant distinctions and dif-
84. Id. at 567.
85. 348 F.3d at 575.
86. See ROGET'S II: THE NEW THESAURUS 261 (3d ed. 1996). The citation for "like"
states: "Possessing the same or almost the same characteristics: alike, analogous, compa-
rable, corresponding, equivalent, parallel, similar, uniform." Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 576.
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ferences in one regulation would undoubtedly create a confusing
and burdensome system. For example, while seats near the very
front of a stadium-style movie theatre would be extremely unde-
sirable, a seating area placed similarly close to a basketball court
or hockey rink would be among the most desirable seats in the
arena. Multi-use facilities amplify these issues, since a particular
seat can be considered excellent for one event and terrible for
another. On a more specific level, each public accommodation fa-
cility is different, and many stadiums and arenas have quirks and
visibility issues unique to them. Attempting to draft a blanket
regulation which would account for all of these different issues
would be an impossible task. By using the term "comparable," the
Access Board allowed for these numerous variations among ve-
nues and events which could not be adequately captured in a more
specifically drawn regulation.
Additionally, reading the regulation to require comparable or
similar viewing angles, rather than just an unobstructed view, is
clearly more in line with the central goals and underlying policy of
the ADA. Both the Hoyts and Cinemark courts have acknowl-
edged that the ADA requires that "[n]o individual shall be discri-
minated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal en-
joyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation." 88 "Full
and equal enjoyment" means more than just being allowed admis-
sion to the venue or event in question. Obviously, by relegating
disabled theatre patrons not only to the least desirable areas of
the theatre in terms of visibility, but also to those seats which ac-
tually cause physical discomfort, the goals of "full and equal en-
joyment" are not reached. As the First Circuit admitted in Hoyts,
it is unreasonably difficult, if not impossible, to provide disabled
patrons with a theatre or arena experience identical to that of
their non-disabled counterparts.89 However, such difficulty does
not excuse the owners and operators of theatre facilities from hav-
ing to make any efforts whatsoever to provide its disabled patrons
with a reasonably similar and enjoyable movie-going experience.
Forcing a group to sit in the worst seats, in terms of both viewing
ability and comfort, based on race, gender, religious affiliation or
other similar criteria would be considered "discriminatory" in
nearly any context. To consider the same behavior, in the context
88. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). See Hoyts, 380 F.3d at 567; Cinemark, 348 F.3d at 576.
89. 380 F.3d at 567.
Vol. 48648
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of disabled patrons, as anything less than discriminatory and
therefore in violation of the ADA would be erroneous.
There is, undoubtedly, a financial interest at stake for many of
the venues affected by section 4.33.3, which goes beyond the po-
tential construction or retrofitting of the venues themselves.
Wheelchair accessible seating areas typically need to be larger per
individual than those reserved for non-disabled patrons, and
sometimes may require additional ramps or elevators to provide
access, which can also reduce the space available for non-disabled
patrons. 90 This would seem to be insignificant in most movie thea-
tres, since it is arguably only during the opening night of the most
highly-anticipated movies that this "lost space" would have any
noticeable financial effect on the theatre. Admittedly, the finan-
cial impact of "losing" this space might be felt more strongly in
arenas and stadiums used for sports and concerts, particularly for
events which are nearly filled to capacity, since every inch of po-
tential seating space is a potentially valuable commodity. 9' The
impact is even greater when considered in the context of an entire
sports or concert season.92 Still, however, in an era of massive
profits and massive venues, the overall financial impact must be
relatively insignificant. More importantly, when balanced against
the rights of disabled patrons to enjoy the same events and shows
as their non-disabled counterparts, this financial impact, even if
not entirely negligible, is hardly compelling.
It is also true, as has been argued, that the Department of Jus-
tice and the Access Board issued section 4.33.3 before the advent
of stadium-style seating. Therefore, they could not have known of
the specific issues that it would create in terms of viewing angles
and could not have drafted regulations to address them specifical-
ly. This, however, does not mean that these entities lacked the
foresight to anticipate eventual changes in the public accommoda-
tion facility industry. As hinted at above, the drafters may have
inserted flexibility into the language of section 4.33.3 to allow for
issues that they may not have thought of or anticipated them-
90. See, e.g., Robert P. O'Quinn, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Time for
Amendments, CATO Institute Policy Analysis no. 158, Aug. 9, 1991, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-158.btml (using this information to argue against the ADA
as a whole).
91. James Kurack, Standing in Front of the Disabled: Judicial Uncertainty Over En-
hanced Sight Lines in Sports Arenas, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161, 184 (2001) (citing,
inter alia, Ind. Living Resources v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 718 (D. Or. 1997).
92. Id.
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selves.93 The fact that the basic floor plan of the modern movie
theatre underwent a major change in the early 1990s, creating
new issues in terms of viewing angles and lines of sight, does not
render the regulation ineffective. The central, larger issue of simi-
larity and comparability of lines of sight has remained. All that is
changed is that a new way in which those lines of sight can differ
has emerged in the years since the regulation was first drafted.
IV. PRESERVING THE FLEXIBILITY OF SECTION 4.33.3
Section 4.33.3 is, admittedly, ambiguous. However, that ambi-
guity is at least partly intentional. The ambiguity inherent in the
phrase "comparable lines of sight" allows for flexibility and adap-
tability in applying the regulation to the numerous types of public
accommodation facilities across the country. Moreover, it allows
for a similar flexibility and adaptability when it comes to new con-
struction and layout methods, which will inevitably emerge as
newer, more modern facilities are designed and constructed. To
narrow such a regulation to cover only "unobstructed views," a
phrase so concise and simple that the drafters could have included
it in the regulation themselves had they so desired, not only de-
stroys this intended flexibility and adaptability, but flies in the
face of the larger goals of the ADA and the entities charged with
enforcing its provisions.
Patrick Manning
93. Regal, 339 F.3d at 1132-33.
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